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75-1506	

25 March 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director

SUBJECT.

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The Warsaw Pact Theater Force Problem (Bean Counting and Distributed Data

Bases)

- 1. Per our conversation at the 24 March NIO meeting and your request levied immediately thereafter, attached is ______ thoughtful study on the whole "Bean Counting" problem which you said you wanted to look at again, plus some related correspondence. Also attached is a short note on the issues involved, prepared by my Conventional Forces colleagues.
- As we have discussed on several previous occasions, I strongly recommend that in your capacity as DCI you appoint an interagency group to survey the whole theater force intelligence problem and make recommendations to you -- with copies to USIB members -- on the way the Intelligence Community ought to structure itself to discharge responsibilities associated with this problem, particularly in light of [I recommend that this group be chaired by your Assistant NIO for Conventional Forces with appropriately senior but knowledgeable representation from CIA/OSR, DIA, NSA and NPIC. The group should be small enough to work effectively, senior enough to have clout and yet not so senior that its members do not know the details of the issues involved. I think there should be preferably one and in any event not more than two representatives of each Intelligence Community component on the group, with a member of the IC Staff participating either as an observer or as a full working member.
- 3. Unless he completely reverses past practice, Danny will resist the formation of such a survey group. Indeed, it will probably take a flat statement from you that such

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a group is being convened before he will be willing to go along. We tried to get such a body organized on 6 December when I met privately with Danny, Lew Allen, John Hicks, Hank Knoche and ______ Danny was adamant 25X1 in opposition then and has not, to my knowledge, changed his mind since then. Speculation about motives is always a chancy enterprise, but in this case I believe he does not want an interagency look at the problem until his distributed data base concept is well enough launched so that he can assert any such look is unnecessary because alternative possibilities have been overtaken by events.

Neither I nor, to the best of my knowledge, any of my colleagues (other than Danny) has made up his mind on precisely how this national intelligence problem ought to be handled. All of us feel it can be handled by some process better than that now being employed. What we now have is not a system (ever designed as such) but an accretion of programs and practices which built up over The theater force problem is national in scope, particularly in light of its MBFR dimension, which goes well beyond "military matters" narrowly defined. one to which all members of USIB can make a contribution and which affects the responsibilities of them all in their contributions to national judgments. It, therefore, ought to be addressed by a national system developed as such, rather than in a manner dictated by the departmental activity or requirements of any single Intelligence Community member.

George A. Carver, Jr.
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

Attachments
TS-0039/DR, Series B,
Cy 1 (for DCI only)

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CC: DDCI w/cy Memorandum fr D/DCI/NIO, dtd 25 Mar 75, same subj
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AD/OSR " " "
DD/S&T " "
D/NPIC " "
D/DCI/IC " "

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